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COMMENTS
DENIAL OF SUBROGATION RIGHTS -
A QUESTION FOR THE COURT OR THE
LEGISLATURE?: WEINBERG v. DINGER
The purpose of the business of insurance is to lessen the risk
of loss imposed on a party by distributing the loss among others
potentially exposed to similar risks.1 Regulation of the insurance
industry was formally delegated to the states when Congress
passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act.2 The doctrine of subrogation
I See IV. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE § 1, at 4 (3d ed. 1951). To
achieve this distribution, the insurer assumes the risk of loss of many insureds, all of whom
are susceptible to the same destruction or impairment of insurable interest; as considera-
tion, the insurer receives a premium based on the insured's proportionate share of the total
risk. See id. at 4-5. In order for a contract calling for an assumption of risk to constitute an
insurance contract, it must involve the payment of a premium and be a major part of a
broad scheme providing for the distribution of risk. Id.; see generally K. ABRAHAM, DISTRIB-
UTING RISK. INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 1-3 (1986) (analyzing principal
purpose of insurance law).
The concept of insurance originated centuries ago in the economic renaissance of Eu-
rope, but did not gain popularity in the United States until the early twentieth century. See
1 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 1.1 (2d ed. 1983); W. VANCE, supra, § 2, at 14,
22; Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry in the Theory of
Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. REV. 471, 471-73 (1961).
2 Ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1982 & Supp.
III 1985)). The Act provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he business of insurance... shall be
subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation ... of such business."
15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (1982). The Act also provides that "[n]o Act of Congress shall be con-
strued to ... supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the
business of insurance ... unless such [congressional] Act specifically relates to the business
of insurance." Id. § 1012(b) (1982).
The McCarran-Ferguson Act was passed by Congress "to allay doubts" raised by the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322
U.S. 533 (1944). See FTC v. Travelers Health Ass'n, 362 U.S. 293, 299 (1960) (discussing
South-Eastern Underwriters). In the South-Eastern Underwriters decision, the Supreme
Court held that the business of insurance was to be considered commerce and thereby sub-
ject to the regulatory powers of Congress under the Commerce Clause. See South-Eastern
Underwriters, 322 U.S. at 539. For 75 years prior to the South-Eastern Underwriters deci-
sion, the Supreme Court had not considered the business of insurance to be commerce. See
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originated in equity3 and allows an insurer to step into the shoes of
its insured in order to recover from a culpable third party.4 Since
Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183 (1868). For discussion of the regulation of the
business of insurance under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, see Rodes, Survey of the Law of
Insurance, 10 RUTGERS L. REv. 219, 219-21 (1955).
' See Mullen, The Equitable Doctrine of Subrogation, 3 Mn. L. REv. 201, 201 (1939).
The doctrine of subrogation is derived from civil law, see Aetna Life Ins. Co., v. Middleport,
124 U.S. 534, 548-49 (1888), and based on ideas of justice and equity. See Prairie State
Bank v. United States, 164 U.S. 227, 231 (1896). It provides for the substitution of a third
party in place of the original claimant where the third party has extinguished the outstand-
ing claim. See Aetna Life Ins., 124 U.S. at 548-49; W. VANCE, supra note 1, § 134, at 787 &
n.1.
Subrogation in equity requires that- the party who made the payment was under an
obligation to do so and, further, that the party actually made the payment now being sought
from the original debtor. See Aetna Life Ins., 124 U.S. at 547-48; First Nat'l City Bank v.
United States, 548 F.2d 928, 936 (Ct. Cl. 1977); see generally Note, Subrogation of an In-
surer Who Pays Without Legal Liability, 36 HARv. L. REv. 330 (1923) (discussion of what
constitutes an obligation to make payment).
' See 2 G. RICHARDS, THE LAW OF INSURANCE § 184 (5th ed. 1952). The doctrine is uti-
lized to provide the insurer relief when forced to pay a legal obligation either wholly or
partially owed by a third party. See Federal Ins. Co. v. Tamiami Trail Tours, 117 F.2d 794,
796 (5th Cir. 1941); see also Kimball & Davis, The Extension of Insurance Subrogation, 60
MICH. L. REv. 841, 841 (1962) (discussion of rationale underlying doctrine of subrogation). It
is generally held that the insurer is subrogated to all causes of action of the insured and
subject to all defenses valid against the insured. See, e.g., Wager v. Providence Ins. Co., 150
U.S. 99, 108 (1893) (insured's agreement with third party to allow credit for all insurance
proceeds binding on insurer); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Erie & Western Transp. Co., 117 U.S. 312,
321 (1886) (insurer's rights limited to those insured had in contract with third party); Great
Am. Ins. Co. v. United States, 575 F.2d 1031, 1034 (2d Cir. 1978) (insurer's cause of action
subject to same statute of limitations as insured's).
At common law, it was generally assumed that the insurer had to bring the action in the
insured's name and not in its own name or right. See, e.g., United States v. American To-
bacco Co., 166 U.S. 468, 474 (1897) (insurer must recover in name of claimant, unless insurer
has a "legal cause of complaint"); St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Commercial
Union Ins. Co., 139 U.S. 223, 235 (1891) (other than in equity or admiralty, cause of action
exists only in insured and must be brought in his name); cf. Hall & Long v. Railroad Cos.,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 367, 370 (1871) (insurer may use name of assured to recover from carrier
in maritime, but not land cases). Under some statutes, the insurer becomes the real party in
interest once it has paid in full for the insured's loss and must then bring suit in its own
name, unless the applicable statute or rule expressly says otherwise. See United States v.
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366, 380-83 (1949) (if subrogee pays entire loss, it is
real party in interest and must sue in own name); see also American Fidelity & Casualty Co.
v. All Am. Bus Lines, 179 F.2d 7, 10 (10th Cir. 1949) (insured fully paid by insurer no longer
real party in interest; so insurer must bring suit in own name); Point Tennis Co. v. Irvin
Indus. Corp., 63 App. Div. 2d 967, 967, 405 N.Y.S.2d 506, 507 (2d Dep't 1978) (legislature
preserved right of insured to sue in own name where insurer issues "loan receipts"). It is not
necessary that the third party's liability for the damage be founded in tort. See, e.g., PaR
Truck Leasing, Inc. v. Bonanza Inc., 425 F.2d 695, 696 (10th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (subro-
gation claim can be asserted based on contractual obligation of third party to insured); Gen-
eral Ins. Co. of Am. v. Faulkner, 259 N.C. 317, 325-26, 130 S.E.2d 645, 652 (1963) (allowing
subrogation for action arising from statutory imposition of vicarious liability); 6A J. Ap-
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the enactment of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the subrogation
doctrine has been codified in many state statutes.5 In New Jersey,
the state legislature has statutorily required fire insurers to include
a clause permitting subrogation in standard fire insurance policies.8
Recently, however, in Weinberg v. Dinger,7 the New Jersey Su-
preme Court held that, although a third-party water company may
be liable to an insured for damage caused by fire,8 the insurer's
right of subrogation to the insured's cause of action should be
denied.9
In Weinberg, the plaintiffs' apartment complex 0 was de-
stroyed by a fire that fire fighters were unable to extinguish be-
cause of inadequate water pressure.11 Penns Grove Water Com-
pany ("Penns Grove"), a private water company responsible for
the installation and maintenance of the water system in the munic-
PLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4051, at 110-11 (1972) (any right of indemnity in-
sured has passes to insurer). Accord Patent Scaffolding Co. v. William Simpson Constr. Co.,
256 Cal. App. 2d 506, 514, 64 Cal. Rptr. 187, 192 (1967) (allowing subrogation for action
stemming from breach of contract); F.H. Vahlsing, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 108 S.W.2d
947, 950 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) (lease provided lessor to pay insured for loss, insurer entitled
to subrogation); but cf. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Morse Signal Devices, 151 Cal. App. 3d
681, 691, 198 Cal. Rptr. 756, 762 (1984) (insurer not subrogated to insured's antitrust claim).
5 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2118(f) (1985) (allowing subrogation of no-fault
insurance carrier to insured's rights); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, para. 375 (Smith-Hurd 1981)
(requiring subrogation of insurer of financial institutions to rights of depositors); N.Y. INS.
LAW § 3404(e) (McKinney 1985) (providing for subrogation clause in standard fire insurance
policy); see also 16 G. COUCH, supra note 1, § 61:6 (identifying jurisdictions providing statu-
tory rights of subrogation).
6 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17.36-5.20 (West 1985). The statute provides that the "[c]om-
pany may require from the insured an assignment of all right of recovery against any party
for loss to the extent that payment therefor is made by this Company." Id.
106 N.J. 469, 524 A.2d 366 (1987).
S See id. at 496, 524 A.2d at 380. The court decided that a private water company could
be liable for negligence in failing to supply adequate water pressure for fighting fires. See id.
This is a departure from the majority rule in the United States, which holds that private
water companies are immune from similar liability absent an express contractual obligation
to provide property owners with sufficient water or water pressure for fire fighting purposes.
See, e.g., Libbey v. Hampton Water Works Co., 118 N.H. 500, 503, 389 A.2d 434, 436 (1978)
(no tort liability for water company's negligent maintenance of pressure); H.R. Moch Co. v.
Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 168, 150 N.E. 896, 899 (1928) (denying indefinite exten-
sion of liability of water company by enlargement of zone of duty); Clark v. Meigs Equip.
Co., 10 Ohio App. 2d 157, 161-62, 226 N.E.2d 791, 793-94 (1967) (insured not permitted to
sue as incidental beneficiary of water company contract). But see Haynie v. Sheldon, Inc.,
No. 80C-DE-107 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 21, 1985) (LEXIS, State library, Omni file) (liability
imposed on water company in accordance with recognized tort principles).
9 See Weinberg, 106 N.J. at 491, 524 A.2d at 378.
10 See id. at 472, 524 A.2d at 367. Weinberg, the owner of the property, and the Coles,
tenants in the apartment complex, brought this suit. Id.
11 Id.
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ipality where the apartment complex was located, was charged by
the plaintiffs with negligence. 12 Defendant Penns Grove, operating
under a filed tariff, had an ongoing service agreement with plaintiff
Weinberg. 13
Penns Grove's motion for summary judgment was granted by
the trial court, and affirmed by the Superior Court, Appellate Divi-
sion,'4 on the basis of the Supreme Court of New Jersey's grant of
water company immunity in Reimann v. Monmouth Consolidated
Water Co.' 5 On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey re-
quested that the parties prepare additional arguments addressing
two issues: the effect that abolishing the immunity would have on
the water companies' ability to obtain liability insurance; and the
rates that water companies would charge their customers in the
event the immunity was eliminated.I After hearing the arguments,
the court reversed the appellate division, overruled Reimann, and
held that private water companies were no longer immune from
liability for negligently failing to provide adequate water pressure
for fire fighting.' However, the court further held that subrogation
claims asserted by fire insurance companies against private water
companies would not be enforced.' 8
12 Id. The alleged negligence on the water company's part consisted of failure to "in-
spect, maintain, and repair its water system, resulting in water pressure inadequate for fire
fighting." Id.
iS Id. The defendant operated "pursuant to the rules and regulations of the Board of
Public Utility Commissioners (BPUC)." Id. The contract with Weinberg, like the filed tariff,
adopted the rules and regulations of the BPUC. Id. at 473, 524 A.2d at 367-68. The Coles
had no direct contractual agreements with the water company. Id. at 473 n.1, 524 A.2d at
367 n.1.
14 See Weinberg v. Penns Grove Water Co., 216 N.J. Super. 409, 411-13, 524 A.2d 403,
404-05 (App. Div. 1984) (per curiam).
'- 9 N.J. 134, 87 A.2d 325 (1952). In Reimann, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held
that, absent an express contractual or statutory obligation, a private water company was not
liable to an individual for negligently failing to provide a sufficient supply of water to com-
bat fires. See id. at 137-38, 87 A.2d at 327. This had long been the rule in New Jersey. See
Baum v. Somerville Water Co., 84 N.J.L. 611, 615, 87 A. 140, 141 (1913); Hall v. Passaic
Water Co., 83 N.J.L. 771, 776, 85 A. 349, 351 (1912). In affirming the lower court in Wein-
berg, the Appellate Division acknowledged that the judicial grant of total immunity to water
companies for fire damage resulting from their negligence stands like a "dinosaur from the
past," but stated that it was bound to follow the precedent set by the Supreme Court.
Weinberg, 216 N.J. Super. at 413, 524 A.2d at 405.
"6 See Weinberg, 106 N.J. at 488, 524 A.2d at 376. In requesting reargument, the court
also asked that the state Attorney General participate on behalf of the BPUC and sought
the participation of the Public Advocate. Id.
17 See id. at 495, 524 A.2d at 380.
18 See id. at 492, 495, 524 A.2d at 378, 380. The court reserved for future determination
"the issue [of] whether recognition of subrogation claims can be justified by the prospect of
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Writing for the court, Justice Stein found that Penns Grove
could be held liable for negligence predicated upon the breach of
duty to the plaintiffs, a duty which arose from the plaintiffs' reli-
ance on the water company to supply adequate water for fire fight-
ing.19 Moreover, as a matter of public policy, this newly established
liability should not encompass claims stemming from the subroga-
tion rights of fire insurance companies. 0 Justice Stein stated that
this limitation was necessary to prevent windfall recoveries by in-
surance carriers and avoid an imposition of undue financial burden
on the water companies.21
Justice Handler, dissenting in part, and Justice Garibaldi, dis-
senting, argued that the majority's decision to limit subrogation
rights was based on insufficient evidence and was a determination
best left to the legislature. 22 Justice Handler reasoned that the ap-
a reduction in fire-insurance rates commensurate with the increase in liability-insurance
costs for water companies." Id. at 495, 524 A.2d at 380.
"9 See id. at 483-92, 524 A.2d at 373-78. The court relied in part on Doyle v. South
Pittsburgh Water Co., 414 Pa. 199, 199 A.2d 875 (1964), "[a] leading case imposing a com-
mon-law duty of care upon water companies." See Weinberg, 106 N.J. at 482, 524 A.2d at
373. The Doyle court reasoned that although the water company involved was under no
obligation to install fire hydrants originally, once installed, the plaintiff was justified in rely-
ing on them and the water company had a duty to properly maintain them. See Doyle, 414
Pa. at 205, 199 A.2d at 878.
20 Weinberg, 106 N.J. at 486-93, 524 A.2d at 376-78. In support of limiting its holding,
the court opined that "[t]he result of imposing subrogation-claim liability on water compa-
nies in such cases would be to shift the risk from the fire-insurance company to the water
company, and, ultimately, to the consumer in the form of increased water rates." Id. at 492,
524 A.2d at 378.
21 See id. at 486-89, 524 A.2d at 375-76. In the court's opinion, the possibility of wind-
fall recoveries was the most compelling argument in favor of retaining private water com-
pany immunity. See id. at 489, 524 A.2d at 376. The court noted, however, that the water
utility could set up a reserve to protect itself from liability losses, or engage in some other
form of self-insurance. See id. at 488-89, 524 A.2d at 376; see also Schwartz & Souk, Recent
Developments in Self-Insurance: Is it Time to Stop Worrying and Love Risk Retention?, 18
FORUMt 636, 638-39 (1983) (analysis of advantages and disadvantages of various methods of
self-insurance).
22 Weinberg, 106 N.J. at 497, 524 A.2d at 381 (Handler, J., concurring in part, dissent-
ing in part); id. at 498, 503-08, 524 A.2d at 381, 384-86 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Justice
Handler concurred in the majority's decision to abrogate water company immunity, but felt
that this abrogation should not have been limited to exclude subrogation claims. See id. at
496-98, 524 A.2d at 380-81 (Handler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Justice Garibaldi, on the other hand, asserted that the majority should have neither
removed the judicially created immunity nor created an exception for subrogation claims; in
her view, both actions conflicted with legislative policy. See id. at 498-508, 524 A.2d at 381-
86 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Such a policy, she posited, was reflected in the legislature's
decision to delegate to the BPUC authority over public utilities and the presence of a stat-
ute requiring a subrogation clause in a standard fire insurance policy. See id. at 503, 524
A.2d at 384 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
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propriate judicial role is to insure consistent and rational applica-
tion of liability rules,23 not to predict their effect on social inter-
ests.24 Justice Garibaldi observed that the denial of subrogation
claims is a far-reaching policy decision and that the case at hand
was not a subrogation case, that neither the parties nor the major-
ity of the amicus curiae participants had briefed or argued the sub-
rogation issue, and that no insurance company had appeared
before the court. 5 Consequently, the court was not provided with
an appropriate record upon which to base its decision.2
In abrogating private water companies' immunity from liabil-
ity for negligently failing to maintain adequate water pressure for
fire fighting, it is suggested that the Weinberg court properly re-
moved an ancient legal relic inconsistent with modern concepts of
justice and fair dealing. It is submitted, however, that by limiting
its holding to cases not involving subrogation claims of fire insur-
ance carriers, the court unjustly denied the insurers' legal rights
and acted inconsistently with well-established principles of modern
tort and insurance law. This Comment will consider the legisla-
tively prescribed system of insurance carrier regulation, the car-
rier's statutory and common-law right to subrogation, and the
weakness of the court's public policy rationale for the denial of
subrogation rights.
REGULATION OF INSURANCE CARRIERS
The New Jersey Legislature vested the Commissioner of In-
surance with the authority to regulate the business of insurance.2
Included in that grant of authority is the power to determine the
22 See id. at 497, 524 A.2d at 381 (Handler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Justice Handler maintained that the judicial role when "cleans[ing] the tort system of its
irrational and anomalous elements" is to promote "principled, consistent" and uniform rules
of tort liability. See id. (Handler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
2 See id. (Handler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Handler noted
that the legislature is the proper forum for determination of what policies best serve preva-
lent social interests. See id. (Handler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
'" See id. at 505, 524 A.2d at 385 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). The only participant to
address the issue of subrogation was the Amicus Department of the Public Advocate; since
the positions of the fire insurers and the liability insurance carriers for water companies
were not presented in this proceeding, the Public Advocate determined that the court
should not address the question of subrogation rights. Id. (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
26 See id. at 505-08, 524 A.2d at 385-86 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
"7 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:1C-1 to :1C-6 (West 1984). The New Jersey Legislature
delegated to the Commissioner of Insurance the authority to issue and adopt rules and regu-
lations deemed necessary to regulate the business of insurance. See id. § 17:1C-6(e).
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equity and fairness of all insurance policy provisions. 28 Addition-
ally, the legislature has required that all standard fire insurance
policies contain a clause allowing the insurer to be subrogated to
all rights of the insured. 29 Typically, the Commissioner of Insur-
ance decides whether the subrogation rights of an insurer should
be limited on the basis of public policy.30 Where no such action has
taken place, a presumption arises that the clause is fair, equitable
and in the public interest.31 Accordingly, it is suggested that it was
improper for the Weinberg court to substitute its judgment regard-
ing subrogation rights for that of the legislatively appointed Com-
missioner.2
In New Jersey, it is well settled that the legislature, not the
judiciary, is the appropriate branch of government to declare pub-
lic policy.3 The court may not supplant legislative determinations
18 See id. § 17:36-5.15 (West 1985). More specifically, the Commissioner may, within his
discretion, permit variations to the legislatively prescribed standard fire policy provisions as
long as the variations are, "with respect to the peril of fire," the equivalent of, or more
favorable to the insured than, the standard form. See id. § 17:36-5.20. All policy forms uti-
lized by insurers must be filed with the Commissioner, see id. § 17:36-5.15, and "[i]f the
Commissioner shall at any time notify any insurer of his disapproval of any such policy form
because it contains provisions which are unjust, unfair, inequitable, misleading or contrary
to law, it shall be unlawful for such insurer thereafter to issue any policy in the form so
disapproved." Id.
20 See id. § 17:36-5.20; supra note 6 (text of provision).
30 See Busch v. Home Ins. Co., 97 N.J. Super. 54, 51, 234 A.2d 250, 252 (App. Div.
1967). Generally, once a legislature has designated a public official as the appropriate vehicle
for determining public policy in a specific area, it is beyond a court's power to interfere with
that official's decisions. See Smith v. Motor Club of Am. Ins. Co., 54 N.J. Super. 37, 43-44,
148 A.2d 37, 41 (Ch. Div.), aff'd, 56 N.J. Super. 203, 152 A.2d 369 (App. Div.), certification
denied, 30 N.J. 563, 154 A.2d 451 (1959); see also District 27 Community School Bd. v.
Board of Educ., 130 Misc. 2d 398, 413, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325, 335 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1986)
(usurpation of function of Commissioner of Health if court determined public policy regard-
ing AIDS victims); E.H. v. Matin, M.D., 168 W. Va. 248, 259-60, 284 S.E.2d 232, 238-39
(1981) (plans for mental health care delivery duty of Department of Health):
31 See, e.g., Jones v. Heymann, 127 N.J. Super. 542, 547, 318 A.2d 43, 46 (App. Div.
1974) (presumption concerning uninsured motorist endorsement); Hartford Ins. Co. v. All-
state Ins. Co., 127 N.J. Super. 460, 466, 317 A.2d 760, 763 (App. Div. 1974) (presumption
regarding motorist coverage), aff'd, 68 N.J. 430, 347 A.2d 353 (1975); Smith, 54 N.J. Super.
at 43, 148 A.2d at 41 (presumption concerning subrogation clauses in auto policies).
12 See Edelstein v. Ferrell, 120 N.J. Super. 583, 594-95, 295 A.2d 390, 397 (Law Div.
1972) (court substituting its judgment for that of duly appointed official held improper).
33 See Smith, 54 N.J. Super. at 43, 148 A.2d at 41; see also Thomas v. Kingsley, 43 N.J.
524, 530, 206 A.2d 161, 164 (1965) (policy decisions are not a court's responsibility); Two
Guys from Harrison, Inc. v. Furman, 32 N.J. 199, 229, 160 A.2d 265, 281 (1960) (legislature
has sole responsibility for policy decisions); Texas Co. v. Di Gaetano, 71 N.J. Super. 413,
431, 177 A.2d 273, 282 (App. Div. 1962) (absent unconstitutionality, policy underlying legis-
lation not judicial matter), aff'd, 39 N.J. 120, 187 A.2d 721 (1963). It was not the Weinberg
court's role to decide what public policy should be followed. See Richardson v. Caputo, 46
1987]
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simply because it disagrees with the underlying policy.3 4 It is thus
suggested that while the Weinberg court was free to question the
legislature's decision to allow subrogation for fire insurance carri-
ers, it was beyond the court's authority to refuse to apply that de-
cision absent a finding of unconstitutionality. 5 Moreover, the only
occasion for the judiciary to interfere with an administrative deci-
sion is if that decision is clearly shown to be statutorily unautho-
rized or arbitrary.3 6 As the relevant statute in Weinberg is not un-
constitutional and the Commissioner's failure to reject insurer
subrogation is neither arbitrary nor contrary to law, it is submitted
that the Weinberg court acted contrary to the cogent statutory ob-
jective of allowing fire insurer subrogation.
Historically, the New Jersey Legislature has indicated areas
where it felt application of the doctrine of subrogation would be
against public policy.3 7 In enacting the New Jersey Tort Claims
N.J. 3, 9, 214 A.2d 385, 388 (1965) (not for court to decide which of several reasonable paths
legislature should follow); Quaremba v. Allan, 128 N.J. Super. 570, 575, 321 A.2d 266, 268
(App. Div. 1974) (not within province of court to decide wisdom behind any constitutionally
permissible legislative regulation), modified on other grounds, 67 N.J. 1, 334 A.2d 321
(1975).
11 See A & B Auto Stores of Jones St., Inc. v. City of Newark, 59 N.J. 5, 19, 279 A.2d
693, 700 (1971); State v. Galiyano, 178 N.J. Super. 393, 396, 429 A.2d 385, 387 (App. Div.),
certification denied, 87 N.J. 424, 434 A.2d 1096 (1981); Sabato v. Sabato, 135 N.J. Super.
158, 166, 342 A.2d 886, 890-91 (Law Div. 1975). The court in A & B Auto Stores stated that
it had the duty to uphold a legislative decision to deny subrogation under the State Mob
Riot Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:48-1 (West 1987), even if the policy underlying that decision
was unappealing. See A & B Auto Stores, 59 N.J. at 19, 279 A.2d at 700. A court's role in
considering the validity of any socioeconomic regulation should be limited to a determina-
tion of whether the rule has a rational basis. See, e.g., Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247
(1976) (only rational basis needed to uphold legislation); United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (not for courts to contradict legislative finding unless it lacks
rational basis).
35 See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730-31 (1963) (court bound to uphold law
unless unconstitutional); State v. Pollara, 130 N.J. Super. 119, 122, 325 A.2d 826, 828 (App.
Div. 1974) (court may disagree with policy of statute but bound to apply statute unless
unconstitutional); cf. Tri-County Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Commissioner of Banking, 170 N.J.
Super. 576, 582, 407 A.2d 844, 847 (App. Div. 1979) (improper for court to usurp function of
legislature under guise of statutory interpretation), certification denied, 82 N.J. 286, 412
A.2d 792 (1980).
11 See City of Newark v. Natural Resource Council, Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 82 N.J.
530, 539-40, 414 A.2d 1304, 1308, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 983 (1980); United Hunters Ass'n of
N.J., Inc. v. Adams, 36 N.J. 288, 292, 177 A.2d 33, 35 (1962); IFA Ins. Co. v. New Jersey
Dep't of Ins., 195 N.J. Super. 200, 207-08, 478 A.2d 1203, 1207 (App. Div.), certification
denied, 99 N.J. 218, 491 A.2d 712 (1984).
37 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:48-1 (West 1987). In 1969, the New Jersey Legislature
amended section 2A:48-1, which deals with the liability of a municipality for property loss
resulting from mob violence or riots, to disallow subrogation rights of insurance carriers. See
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Act,s the legislature expressly barred subrogation claims in suits
against public entities and employees.39 The legislature's rationale
"reflect[ed] a recognition that profit-making insurance companies
[were] in a better position to withstand losses ... than [were] the
already economically burdened public entities. ' 40 The Weinberg
court suggested that this same reasoning was applicable to insulate
a private water company from a subrogation claim by an insurer.41
It is submitted, however, that this rationale should not be ex-
tended to private water companies. Although water companies may
be classified as public utilities,42 a majority are privately owned
and operate under the same profit-motive as. insurance carriers.43
Unlike insurance carriers, water companies, because of the essen-
tial nature of their business, operate as a public monopoly free
from competition.44 The court's decision to force an unprotected
Act of Jan. 2, 1969, ch. 386, 1968 N.J. Laws 1277 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:48-1
(West 1987)).
" See New Jersey Tort Claims Act, ch. 45, 1972 N.J. Laws 140 (codified as amended at
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 59:1-1 to :12-3 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987)).
" See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:9-2(e) (West 1982). In pertinent part, the statute provides
that, "[n]o insurer or other person shall be entitled to bring an action under a subrogation
provision in an insurance contract against a public entity or public employee." Id.
40 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:9-2, comment at 597 (West 1982).
41 See Weinberg, 106 N.J. at 492, 524 A.2d at 378. However, the Supreme Court of the
United States has refused to equate actions by a public utility with actions by the state. See
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358-59 (1974).
42 See Lewandowski v. Brookwood Musconetcong River Property Owners Ass'n, 37 N.J.
433, 443, 181 A.2d 506, 512 (1962). Two conditions must be met in order for a water com-
pany to be brought within the definition of public utility: "(1) that it [the water company]
owns, operates, manages or controls a water system for public use, and (2) that it does this
under privileges granted by the State or any of its political subdivisions." Id. at 443-44, 181
A.2d at 512; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:2-13 (West 1969 & Supp. 1987) (definition of public
utility).
43 See generally 2 A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION, THEORY AND
APPLIcATION 751-70 (1969) (analysis of operation and regulation of water companies). Mu-
nicipalities are granted immunity on the basis of public policy and not because the benefi-
ciary of the municipality's actions is the general public. See Sunderland, The Liability of
Water Companies for Fire Losses, 3 MICH. L. REv. 443, 450 (1905). Consequently, evidence
that a water company's business benefits the public is not enough to qualify the company
for this "technical exception" to general liability rules. See id.
44 See Community Builders, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 652 F.2d 823, 829 (9th Cir. 1981);
R. POSNER, ECONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAW § 12.1, at 252-53 (2d ed. 1977). Regulatory agencies
attempt, often unsuccessfully, to prohibit public utilities from earning monopolistic profits
for providing essential services by establishing complex rate-setting schedules. See R. Pos-
NER, supra, § 12.2, at 255.
The Weinberg court stated that because water companies are public utilities, their op-
erating costs are paid primarily by their customers, and, therefore, no subrogation liability
should be imposed. See Weinberg, 106 N.J. at 492, 524 A.2d at 378. However, the corollary
to this rationale would suggest that subrogation should be denied in all cases involving a
19871
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insurance carrier to bear the financial burden of a competitively
protected water company's negligence shifts the loss away from the
wrongdoer and on to a party without fault.45 This not only in-
creases the water company's ability to earn monopolistic profits
but undermines the purpose of finding the water company's behav-
ior actionable.4"
STATUTORY AND COMMON-LAW RIGHT TO SUBROGATION
Although not an absolute right,47 subrogation is a favored
principle in the law.48 Derived from statute, contractual agreement,
or judicial decree,4 an insurer may be subrogated to any action
business entity since the operating costs of all profitable businesses are paid by the consum-
ing public.
According to the Weinberg court, if fire insurance carriers were permitted to enforce
subrogation claims, water companies would raise water rates to cover increased costs,
thereby passing the potential loss onto the consumer in the form of higher rates. See Wein-
berg, 106 N.J. at 492, 524 A.2d at 378. The court believed that this forced consumers to "pay
twice": first, directly in the form of personal property insurance premiums and second, indi-
rectly through increased water rates used by the water company to purchase liability insur-
ance. See id. Typically, however, subrogation rights have been allowed even where the con-
sumer may be required to "pay twice." See, e.g., Iowa Power & Light Co. v. Board of Water
Works Trustees of Des Moines, 281 N.W.2d 827, 834 (Iowa Ct. App. 1979) (water company
held strictly liable for loss, subrogation upheld).
" Weinberg, 106 N.J. at 504, 524 A.2d at 384-85 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
46 See Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of
Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554, 590 (1961). If the decision as to whom should bear the burden
of the loss is made on the basis of which enterprise is financially better off, then there is
little purpose in the application of a negligence standard. See id. at 590 n.75. Under theories
of enterprise liability, if a company is not held financially responsible for its actions, then
the purpose of the law finding the company's conduct actionable is not met. See id. at 598.
It has been argued that it is not unreasonable to impose liability on a water company be-
cause of the economic benefit it receives as a result of its activities. See Recent Cases,
Torts-Liability of Water Company to Individuals for Failure to Furnish Water, 26 TEMP.
L.Q. 214, 217 (1953).
11 See Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Pellecchia, 15 N.J. 162, 171-72, 104 A.2d 288, 292-
93 (1954); 6A J. APPLEMAN, supra note 4, § 4051. Subrogation will not be allowed when it
will deprive the party against whom it is claimed of any legal or equitable rights. See Stan-
dard Accident, 15 N.J. at 171-72, 104 A.2d at 292-93; see also Ray v. Donohew, 352 S.E.2d
729, 738 (W. Va. 1986) (subrogation allowed only where strong case of right to such equita-
ble relief exists and no injustice will result to other party).
'8 See Schmid v. First Camden Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 130 N.J. Eq. 254, 260, 22 A.2d
246, 253 (Ch. 1941). Courts generally extend the subrogation doctrine rather than limit it.
See id.; Standard Accident, 15 N.J. at 172, 104 A.2d at 292; South Shore Nat'l Bank v.
Donner, 104 N.J. Super. 169, 178, 249 A.2d 25, 30 (Law Div. 1969); see also Stevelee Factors,
Inc. v. State, 136 N.J. Super. 461, 466, 346 A.2d 624, 627 (Ch. Div. 1975) (doctrine of subro-
gation given "wide application" by courts), aff'd, 144 N.J. 346, 365 A.2d 713 (1976).
" See Aetna Ins. Co. v. Gilchrist Bros., Inc., 85 N.J. 550, 560, 428 A.2d 1254, 1259
(1981). Some states, including New Jersey, have enacted statutes expressly allowing the in-
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found to exist between its insured and the wrongdoer,50 so long as
the actionable conduct was the underlying cause of the damage
paid for by the insurer.51 Courts in many jurisdictions, including
New Jersey, have repeatedly recognized a conventional and an eq-
uitable right to subrogation, 5 the latter of which allows subroga-
tion to the assured's cause of action absent a contractual
agreement.53
In standard insurance policies, statutory approval or denial of
the insertion of a subrogation provision determines an insurance
carrier's right to subrogation.5 4 In numerous jurisdictions, the state
legislature has determined the provisions to be contained in every
surer to assert subrogation claims. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text (discussing
such provisions). Lack of a statutory provision or contractual agreement will not bar an
insurer's right to subrogation; the court will impose subrogation where equity requires. See,
e.g., Memphis & Little Rock R.R. v. Dow, 120 U.S. 287, 301-02 (1887) (subrogation a "crea-
ture of equity... [and] enforced solely for the purpose of accomplishing the ends of sub-
stantial justice").
50 See Standard Accident, 15 N.J. at 171, 104 A.2d at 292. Subrogation is solely a de-
rivative action, with the insurer succeeding to rights no broader in scope than those of the
insured. See Standard Accident, 15 N.J. at 172-73, 104 A.2d at 293; Board of Educ. v. Kane
Acoustical Co., 51 N.J. Super. 319, 327, 143 A.2d 853, 858 (App. Div. 1958); 16 G. CoucH,
supra note 1, § 61:37; see also supra note 4 and accompanying text (limit of insurer's right
to subrogation).
51 See Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 285 U.S. 209, 214
(1932); St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 139 U.S. 223,
235 (1891); Standard Accident, 15 N.J. at 171, 104 A.2d at 292.
62 See Jorski Mill & Elevator Co. v. Farmers Elevator Mut. Ins. Co., 404 F.2d 143, 147
(10th Cir. 1968); Public Serv. Co. v. Black & Veatch, 328 F. Supp. 14, 16 (N.D. Okla. 1971);
Standard Accident, 15 N.J. at 171-72, 104 A.2d at 292-93; see generally Kimball & Davis,
supra note 4, passim (discussion of distinction between equitable and conventional).
Conventional subrogation arises out of an agreement reached between the insurer and
the insured. See Jorski Mill, 404 F.2d at 147; Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. American
Employers Ins. Co., 209 F.2d 60, 65 (6th Cir. 1954); Lawyers' Title Guar. Fund v. Sanders,
571 P.2d 454, 456 (Okla. 1977). Equitable subrogation arises through operation of law, either
judicially created or declared by statute. See Commercial Standard, 209 F.2d at 64; Gil-
christ Bros., 85 N.J. at 560, 428 A.2d at 1259; Eckmeyer v. Colburn, 138 N.J. Super. 164,
167, 350 A.2d 307, 308-09 (Law Div. 1975).
63 See Memphis & Little Rock R.R. v. Dow, 120 U.S. 287, 301-02 (1887) (subrogation
created by equity, not contract); Continental Casualty Co. v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co.,
605 F.2d 1340, 1344 (5th Cir. 1979) (right of subrogation not founded on contract), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 929 (1980); City Stores Co. v. Lerner Shops, Inc., 410 F.2d 1010, 1011 (D.C.
Cir. 1969) (right to subrogation is equitable not contractual).
5' See, e.g., Home Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dean, 367 N.W.2d 568, 569 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
(state no-fault insurance act limits insurer's subrogation rights); Gilchrist Bros., 85 N.J. at
562, 428 A.2d at 1260 (contractual agreement for subrogation not binding if contrary to
statutory provision); Eckmeyer, 138 N.J. Super. at 167, 350 A.2d at 308-09 (auto insurance
statute contains provision allowing subrogation, subrogation permitted notwithstanding ab-
sence in policy).
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fire insurance policy.55 The standard fire insurance policy in New
Jersey contains a subrogation clause allowing the insurer to require
the insured to assign to it all rights of recovery.56
Despite continuous legislative and judicial approval of the
doctrine of subrogation in New Jersey,57 the Weinberg court de-
nied the insurer's right to subrogation without a hearing on the
issue.58 Where an insurer's claim to subrogation is permitted by
statute5e and is based on a valid cause of action, the insurer has a
legal right to subrogation. 0 It is submitted that the denial of this
right without a hearing is a violation of the insurer's constitution-
ally protected right of due process.61
55 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:36-5.20 (West 1985); see also CAL. INS. CODE § 2071
(Deering 1976 & Supp. 1987); N.Y. INs. LAW § 3404 (McKinney 1985); see generally Rodes,
supra note 2 (discussing statutory regulation of insurance industry).
'6 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:36-5.20 (West 1985); supra note 6 (text of provision).
5 See, e.g., Aetna Ins. Co. v. Gilchrist Bros., 85 N.J. 550, 560-61, 428 A.2d 1254, 1259
(1981) (describing subrogation in New Jersey); George M. Brewster & Son v. Catalytic Con-
str. Co., 17 N.J. 20, 28, 109 A.2d 805, 809 (1954) (same); Sullivan v. Naiman, 130 N.J.L. 278,
280, 32 A.2d 589, 590 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (same).
58 See Weinberg, 106 N.J. at 495, 524 A.2d at 380; id. at 504, 524 A.2d at 384 (Gari-
baldi, J., dissenting). Justice Garibaldi viewed the court's denial of the fire insurer's subro-
gation rights as "cavalier disregard" for contracts entered into under the authority of the
legislature. See id. (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
8 See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
60 See Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Pellecchia, 15 N.J. 162, 172, 104 A.2d 288, 293
(1954) (subrogee can recover only when a valid cause of action exists); see also 6A J. Ap-
PLEMAN, supra note 4, § 4053 (subrogation arises by operation of law or through formal
assignment of claim). Where a water company has been found liable to an insured for prop-
erty damage caused by fire, the insurer has been found to have a right to subrogation of the
claim. Powell & Powell v. Wake Water Co., 171 N.C. 290, 295, 88 S.E. 426, 429-30 (1916); cf.
Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Carolina Peanut Co., 186 F.2d 816, 820 (4th Cir. 1951) (insurer
subrogated to insured's negligence action against electric power company).
1 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550
(1965) (minimum requirement to insure due process is notice of a hearing); Mullane v. Cen-
tral Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (due process requires interested
parties be given notice and opportunity to be heard); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S 385, 394
(1914) ("fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard"). New
Jersey also recognizes the right to a hearing as an essential element of due process. See
Darmstatter v. City Council, 81 N.J.L. 162, 165, 79 A. 545, 546 (Sup. Ct. 1911); State v.
Lebbing, 158 N.J. Super. 209, 216, 385 A.2d 938, 942 (Law Div. 1978) (due process requires
fundamental right to be heard). The party to be bound must have adequate notice to be
permitted representation in the proceedings. See Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 550; Mullane, 339
U.S. at 314; see also Parks v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., 98 N.J. 42, 47, 484 A.2d 4, 7 (1984)
(right of insurer to be present at liability hearing); Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 96 N.J.
336, 344, 476 A.2d 250, 254 (1984) (unjust for court to enact procedural rule denying party
right to be heard). In determining the applicability of the due process provisions, the correct
focus is on the nature of the right denied and not on the weight of the party's interest. See
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 575-76 (1975); see also State ex rel. D.G.W., 70 N.J. 488, 502,
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PUBLIC POLICY AGAINST THE LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
The Weinberg court found that the third-party water com-
pany was liable in tort to the insured for its negligence, but was
not subject to the insurer's subrogation claim.62 The primary func-
tion of the law of torts is to provide compensation for injuries sus-
tained by one person as a result of the wrongful actions of an-
other.6 3 Tort liability may be imposed upon a finding that a party
has increased the danger of a situation, 4 or deprived an injured
party the opportunity of seeking help from alternate sources.6 5 Ab-
sent a duty to personally provide assistance, an actor is minimally
required to use reasonable care to assure that its actions do not
prevent others from providing aid. 6 Where a party has interfered
with one rendering assistance, or increased the danger of a situa-
tion, resultant damages may be apportioned on the basis of the
contribution to the total harm.67 Therefore, despite valuation diffi-
361 A.2d 513, 520 (1976) (due process protections expanded to property interests). No state
has the authority to "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Action by a state court is deemed to be action by the
state itself. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 942 (1982) (issuance of writ of
attachment by state court constitutes state action); J. NOWAcK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG,
CONsTrrUTIONAL LAW § 12.1, at 421 (3d ed. 1986). Following this rationale, it is submitted
that the Weinberg court's denial of subrogation rights without notice or an opportunity to
be heard may be viewed as a due process violation.
62 Weinberg, 106 N.J. at 495, 524 A.2d at 380.
63 See People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 255, 495 A.2d
107, 111 (1985) (purpose of tort law is to compensate wronged person for injuries); Haynie v.
Sheldon, Inc. No. 80C-DE-107 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 21, 1985) (LEXIS, State library, Omni
file) (purpose of tort law is to force wrongdoer to bear burden of loss); W. PROSSER & W.
KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 20 (5th ed. 1984).
64 See St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Simons, 176 F.2d 654, 659 (10th Cir. 1949)
(once railroad learns trespasser in position of danger, duty arises to avoid increasing that
danger); Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. v. Marrs, 119 Ky. 954, 957, 85 S.W. 188, 190 (1905)
(duty to prevent drunk from wandering around train yard); Parvi v. City of Kingston, 41
N.Y.2d 553, 559, 394 N.Y.S.2d 161, 165, 362 N.E.2d 960, 964-65 (1977) (police have duty not
to relocate drunk to area of danger).
615 See United States v. Gavagan, 280 F.2d 319, 328-29 (5th Cir. 1960) (Coast Guard's
negligent failure to rescue ship actionable since potential rescuers abstained in reliance on
Coast Guard efforts), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 933 (1961); Sneider v. Hyatt Corp., 390 F. Supp.
976, 980 n.2 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (innkeeper's failure to check on guest after repeated phone
calls advising of suicidal tendency constituted negligent interference with rescue). Liability
is imposed on any person who knowingly or negligently prevents a third person from render-
ing assistance necessary to prevent physical harm. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 327
(1965).
61 Guardian Trust & Deposit Co. v. Fisher, 200 U.S. 57, 68-69 (1906); see also Doyle v.
South Pittsburgh Water Co., 414 Pa. 199, 202, 199 A.2d 875, 878 (1964) (once hydrants
installed, obligation arises to use reasonable care to maintain them).
67 See Hughes v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 236 F.2d 71, 75 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
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culties,6 8 the water company in Weinberg would be liable only for
damages caused by its own negligence."'
In furtherance of the general principles of tort liability, 70 in-
surers are generally permitted to assert subrogation claims against
tortfeasors to avoid unjust enrichment.71 Disallowing subrogation
claims absolves the wrongdoer of liability as a result of the in-
sured's prudence in obtaining insurance. 2 A wrongdoer thereby
352 U.S. 989 (1957); Ristan v. Frantzen, 26 N.J. Super. 225, 230-31, 97 A.2d 726, 728 (App.
Div. 1953), aff'd, 14 N.J. 455, 102 A.2d 614 (1954); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A
(1965). The Restatement will allow apportionment of damages where the harms caused are
distinct or where there is a "reasonable basis" for determining the contribution of each
cause to a single harm. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965). "There may be
many... cases in which the original wrongdoer is liable for the additional harm caused by
the intervening negligence of the later one, while the latter is liable only for what he himself
caused." Id. at comment 6.
The general rule in New Jersey is that the defendant is only liable for such portion of
the total damage as may properly be attributed to the defendant's negligence. See Common-
wealth Land Title Ins. Co. v. Conklin Assocs., 152 N.J. Super. 1, 10, 377 A.2d 740, 747 (Law
Div. 1977), aff'd, 167 N.J. Super. 392, 400 A.2d 1208 (App. Div. 1979); Jenkins v. Pennsylva-
nia Ry. Co., 67 N.J.L. 331, 336, 51 A. 704, 706 (Sup. Ct. 1902). A distinction is made be-
tween damages that would have resulted from natural causes or from another party's negli-
gence had defendant's conduct been reasonable, and damages in excess of those which are
attributable to defendant's negligence. See id. at 335, 51 A. at 705.
"6 See Felter v. Delaware & H. R.R. Corp., 19 F. Supp. 852, 855 (M.D. Pa. 1937), affd,
98 F.2d 868 (3d Cir. 1938). Determination of damages with mathematical accuracy is not a
prerequisite to apportionment of damages. Id.; see generally Recent Cases, Torts-Liability
of a Railroad for Obstructing a Crossing-Uncertain Damage, 12 TEMP. L.Q. 132 (1937)
(discussing cases where damages awarded absent evidence of actual amount).
69 See Felter, 19 F. Supp. at 854-55. In Felter, negligent conduct of the railroad com-
pany prevented fire fighters from extinguishing a fire, yet the railroad was held liable for
less than one-half of the value of the property destroyed. See id. If this rationale were ap-
plied to the Weinberg scenario, a water company would never be held liable for the entire
loss caused by a fire because the water company is called upon for service only after the fire
has started and a certain amount of damage has already been sustained. See Grossman, The
Liability of Water Companies in New Jersey for Negligent Failure to Supply Adequate
Pressure at Hydrants, 81 N.J.L.J., Oct. 16, 1958, at 521, col. 4. It is submitted that, given
the New Jersey rule on the apportionment of damages, a water company would not be ex-
posed to limitless liability as maintained by the Weinberg court. See Weinberg, 106 N.J. at
493, 524 A.2d at 379.
70 See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 63, § 2 (general discussion of policies
underlying tort liability).
7' See Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Pellecchia, 15 N.J. 162, 172, 104 A.2d 288, 292
(1954) (without subrogation, third-party tortfeasor incurs no liability); Interstate Fire &
Casualty Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 45 Wis. 2d 331, 338-39, 173 N.W.2d 187, 189 (1970)
(municipality-wrongdoer subject to subrogation to avoid unjust enrichment).
72 See Sentry Ins. Co. v. Stuart, 246 Ark. 680, 684-85, 439 S.W.2d 797, 800 (1969) (third
party should not benefit from injured party's insurance). Subrogation serves the concept of
justice in two ways: first, by prohibiting the wrongdoer from escaping the legal obligation of
his tortious act; and second, by disallowing double recovery by the insured. See Standard
Accident, 15 N.J. at 171, 104 A.2d at 292; Frost v. Porter Leasing Corp, 386 Mass. 425, 428,
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benefits from the insured's insurance policy without being either a
party to or a third-party beneficiary of the policy.73 The Weinberg
court, by excluding the insurer's subrogation claim7 4 has enabled
the water company to avoid responsibility for its actions despite its
culpability.7 5 It is submitted that such a result is contrary to public
policy and is less desirable than requiring water companies to bear
the burden of their negligent actions.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has suggested that the New Jersey Supreme
Court's decision to limit its holding by denying insurance carriers'
subrogation claims was unjustified. Extinguishing the rights of the
insurance carrier without an opportunity to be heard was a viola-
tion of their constitutionally guaranteed due process rights. Fur-
ther, the right of the insurance carrier to be subrogated to any
valid claim of the insured is inherent in the well-settled doctine of
subrogation. The New Jersey Legislature specifically granted fire
insurance carriers the right to subrogation and vested the Commis-
sioner of Insurance with the authority to evaluate policy provi-
sions; therefore, it is for the Commissioner to determine in which
cases this right should be denied. Although the need to limit the
potential liability exposure of private water companies may be a
serious policy consideration, it was beyond the court's authority to
determine in which way that exposure should be limited.
Beth Jacobwitz
436 N.E.2d 387, 389 (1982) (subrogation prevents double recovery by insured); see also 16 G.
COUCH, supra note 1, § 61:18 (subrogation has dual purpose of preventing double recovery to
insured and reimbursing insurer).
73 See Kimball & Davis, supra note 4, at 841.
7' See Weinberg, 106 N.J. at 493, 524 A.2d at 378.
7 See 16 G. COUCH, supra note 1, § 61:18. Avoiding this type of unjust enrichment of a
third-party tortfeasor is the underlying rationale for the doctrine of subrogation. See id.
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